A revised framework of information security principles by Teixeira, André & Soares, Filipe de Sá
A Revised Framework of Information Security 
Principles 
André Teixeira and Filipe de Sá-Soares 
Centro Algoritmi, Departamento de Sistemas de Informação, Universidade do Minho, 
Guimarães (Portugal), email: andrerteixeira@gmail.com, fss@dsi.uminho.pt 
Abstract   Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability are referred to as the basic 
principles of Information Security. These principles have remained virtually un-
changed over time, but several authors argue they are clearly insufficient to pro-
tect information. Others go a step further and propose new security principles, to 
update and complement the traditional ones. Prompt by this context, the aim of 
this work is to revise the framework of Information Security principles, making it 
more current, complete, and comprehensive. Based on a systematic literature re-
view, a set of Information Security principles is identified, defined and character-
ized, which, subsequently, leads to a proposal of a Revised Framework of Infor-
mation Security Principles. This framework was evaluated in terms of 
completeness and wholeness by intersecting it with a catalog of threats, which re-
sulted from the merger of four existing catalogs. An initial set of security metrics, 
applied directly to the principles that constitute the framework, is also suggested, 
allowing, in case of adverse events, to assess the extent to which each principle 
was compromised and to evaluate the global effectiveness of the information pro-
tection efforts. 
1 Introduction 
The generalization of Information Systems (IS) to all areas of society, coupled 
with the constant evolution of Information Technology (IT), configures an ecosys-
tem where it is relatively cheap and easy to store, process, and share information. 
This ecosystem presents several opportunities for organizations and individuals, 
profoundly changing the way they communicate, organize, and interact. The same 
ecosystem, however, raises a host of risks to the information manipulation activi-
ties, justifying concerns and investments in the protection of information and re-
lated resources. 
Traditionally, information and IS protection has been guided by three basic 
principles: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, often referred to as the CIA 
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model, with the acronym capturing the first letter of each of the three principles. 
However, some authors argue that these principles, although basilar and im-
portant, may not be sufficient since they do not address all Information Security 
(InfoSec) threats and have not evolved at the same pace of the threats. As Parker 
(1998, p. 211) noted fifteen years ago, “We need a new model to replace the cur-
rent inarticulate, incomplete, and incorrect descriptions of information security. 
The current models limit the scope of information security mostly to computer 
technology and ignore the sources of the problems that information security ad-
dresses. They also employ incorrect meanings for the words they use and do not 
include some of the important types of loss such as stealing copies of information 
and representing information.” 
Over the years, the dissatisfaction with the CIA model led several authors to 
redefine existing principles or to propose new principles that complement and up-
date the traditional ones. Among those authors are Parker (1998), Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000), Stamp (2006), and Whitman and Mattord (2011). 
We use the expression “information security principles” to mean those attrib-
utes of information and other IS resources that may work as guidelines, goals, or 
focal points for the information protection efforts. The importance of the princi-
ples is that by identifying them we are actually defining information security, de-
ducing from them InfoSec objectives, concerns, and scope. The acceptance of the 
foundational or ontological role of the principles for the activity of information se-
curity management predicates that it is important to base the implementation of In-
foSec controls on a firm, complete and updated set of InfoSec principles. 
In this work we propose a revised framework of information security princi-
ples. Prior to the proposal, we undertake a review of the literature on information 
security principles, followed by an exercise where we relate InfoSec threats to the 
principles. The revised framework is composed of a set of definitions and a sche-
matic structure for the organization of the principles. In the end, we suggest an ini-
tial set of metrics to evaluate the extent of InfoSec principles’ compromise. 
2 Analysis of Literature on Information Security Principles 
The first step we took towards the revised framework of InfoSec principles was 
the identification and characterization of the attributes literature indicates explicit-
ly or implicitly as information security principles. 
The nodal point for this review was the set of definitions found in the literature 
for those attributes. From an operational point of view, we used three main 
sources of definitions. The first source was dictionaries where we sought the defi-
nition for the pivotal word of each concept reviewed (two dictionaries were con-
sulted: a dictionary of the Portuguese language and a dictionary of the English 
language, namely the dictionary of the Academy of Sciences of Lisbon and the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary). The second source of definitions were publications 
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by international organizations in the field of InfoSec, such as standards published 
by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), as well as historically relevant references, 
e.g. Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC), Generally Ac-
cepted Information Security Principles (GAISP) and Control Objectives for In-
formation and related Technology (COBIT). The third source of definitions were 
documents were individual authors delineated their understanding of InfoSec prin-
ciples. From these sources, a total of seventeen security attributes were identified. 
In order to compare the definitions we established a schema composed of four 
parameters: scope where the definition was presented, i.e., the domain or theme of 
the work reviewed; nature assigned to the principle defined; object focused in the 
definition; and the purpose assigned to the principle. 
To avoid a tedious recitation of definitions, we chose to present the reviewed 
definitions in tabular form. For each of the concepts discussed we condensed the 
definitions in a table that identifies the proponents of the definition and its scope, 
nature, object, and purpose. For those cases where it was not possible to fill all the 
fields, we marked the missing values as n/a (not available). 
These tables provide a general and immediate overview of the terms and ex-
pressions used, facilitating the identification of common and divergent points be-
tween the authors, as well as to verify if there is a common sense among the defi-
nitions advanced for the same concept. 
2.1 The Triad 
The first group of concepts reviewed composes the traditional triad of InfoSec – 
CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability). For a long time these three prin-
ciples formed the fundamental model on which InfoSec rested. 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is one of three basic and traditional InfoSec principles and, proba-
bly, the one that is most easily and frequently associated with security. Historical-
ly, it has military roots and it was the first principle formalized in a seminal In-
foSec document – the TCSEC (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria), 
based on the Bell-LaPadula lattice model. 
Table 1 summarizes the review made on the concept of confidentiality. 
Table 1. Summary of Confidentiality Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese Quality n/a Do not make public 
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Dictionary what is secret, con-
fidential or reserved 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a Information Do not disclose in 
unauthorized man-
ner 
EC (1991), 
Rannenberg (1993) 
IT Security 
Evaluation 
Essential 
aspect 
Information Prevent unauthor-
ized disclosure 
ISSA (2004) InfoSec 
Guidance 
Characteristic Information Disclose only to au-
thorized people, en-
tities and processes 
at authorized times 
and in authorized 
ways 
Stoneburner et al. 
(2004) 
IT Security 
Engineering 
Security 
goal 
Data Protection against 
unauthorized read 
attempts 
ISO (2005, 2009) Information 
Security 
Property Information Do not make availa-
ble or disclose to 
unauthorized indi-
viduals, entities or 
processes 
Bowen et al. 
(2006) 
InfoSec 
Management 
Security 
objective 
Information Preserve authorized 
restrictions on ac-
cess and disclosure 
ITGI (2007) IT Control and 
Governance 
Control 
criteria 
Sensitive 
information 
Protection from un-
authorized disclo-
sure 
Neumann (1995) Computer 
Risks 
Term Information Protection from un-
intended disclosure 
Parker (1998) Computer 
Crime 
Element Knowledge Limit the observa-
tion and disclosure 
Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Security 
principle 
Data Restrict access to 
authorized entities 
Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2003) 
Computing 
Security 
Security 
goal 
Computational 
asset 
Grant access only to 
authorized parties 
Posthumus and 
von Solms (2004) 
InfoSec 
Governance 
Key 
characteristic 
Informational 
asset 
Keep informational 
assets secret 
Stamp (2006) InfoSec 
Technologies 
Security 
principle 
Information Prevent unauthor-
ized reading 
Cole (2009) Network 
Security 
Security 
principle 
Information Detect and deter un-
authorized disclo-
sure 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2010) 
InfoSec 
Management 
Characteristic Information Ensure access based 
on demonstrated 
need and privileges 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Critical  
characteristic 
Information Ensure access based 
on privileges and 
rights 
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Stewart et al. 
(2011) 
Study Guide 
for InfoSec 
Professionals 
Security 
principle 
Data, objects or 
resources 
Protect from unau-
thorized access 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001), Dobson  
and Sawyer (2006) 
Computing 
Systems 
Dependability 
Attribute Information Absence of unau-
thorized disclosure 
Trivedi et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
and Security 
Models 
System 
ability 
Computing 
system 
Prevent disclosure to 
unauthorized parties 
and ensure access 
only to those author-
ized 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation 
Security 
goal 
Information Preserve authorized 
restrictions 
Lazzaronni et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial 
Control Systems 
Security 
Property System 
resources 
Shall only be read 
by authorized users 
 
This is the principle that deals with secrecy, covering information in storage, 
during processing, and while in transit. 
In terms of scope, more than half of the definitions for confidentiality are pre-
sented in the context of InfoSec, with an emphasis on the management and gov-
ernance of InfoSec and on the principles and guidelines of InfoSec. 
Regarding the nature of the concept, there is no clear trend, although goal, 
characteristic, and principle stand out. 
In what concerns the objects targeted by the definitions there is, unsurprisingly, 
the predominance of information, followed by data and systems. 
The purpose of confidentiality is, according to most authors, to not disclose, to 
not make available and to not allow access to information by unauthorized entities 
or people or in unauthorized ways. Authors like Parker (1998) and Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2003) have called attention for the fact that confidentiality should not 
have as sole concern the disclosure of (secret) information, but also voluntary or 
involuntary observation, printing or simply knowing that a particular information 
asset exists. Underlying these concerns is the theme of access to information and 
its control, which is strongly related to the authorization process. An additional 
observation is that confidentiality may be temporary (ISSA 2004), meaning that 
information may be classified as confidential for a specific period of time. 
In general it can be concluded that, based on the reviewed definitions, there is 
consensus among the authors, but without any conception standing out and whose 
definition is adopted generally. 
Integrity 
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The principle of integrity is also part of the traditional model of InfoSec. For the 
general public, however, it is probably less noticeable than confidentiality. It fol-
lowed confidentiality in terms of formalization, conveyed in the Biba model. 
Table 2 summarizes the review made on the concept of integrity. 
Table 2. Summary of Integrity Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Quality n/a Keep intact, whole 
and integral 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
Condition 
Quality 
Information Be unchanged, 
complete or undi-
vided 
EC (1991); 
Rannenberg (1993) 
IT 
Evaluation 
Essential 
aspect 
Information Prevent unauthor-
ized modification 
ISSA (2004) InfoSec 
Guidance 
Characteristic Information 
Information 
system 
Preserve accuracy 
and completeness 
Stoneburner et al. 
(2004) 
IT Security 
Engineering 
Security 
goal 
Data 
System 
Protect against un-
authorized modifi-
cation and manipu-
lation 
ISO (2005, 2009) Information 
Security 
Property Organizational 
assets 
Protect accuracy 
and completeness 
Bowen et al. 
(2006) 
InfoSec 
Management 
Security 
objective 
Information Guard against im-
proper modifica-
tion or destruction 
ITGI (2007) IT Control and 
Governance 
Control 
criteria 
Sensitive 
information 
Accuracy, com-
pleteness and va-
lidity according to 
business 
Neumann (1995) Computer 
Risks 
Term Data 
System 
Maintenance in an 
unimpaired condi-
tion 
Parker (1998) Computer 
Crime 
Element 
Quality 
Information Wholeness, com-
pleteness, readabil-
ity and unchanged 
from a previous 
state 
Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Security 
principle 
Data, signs 
and symbols 
Maintain values 
and correction and 
ensure interpreta-
tion according to 
business rules 
Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2003) 
Computing 
Security 
Security 
objective 
Computational 
asset 
Modify only by 
authorized parties 
and in authorized 
ways 
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Posthumus and 
von Solms (2004) 
InfoSec 
Governance 
Key 
characteristic 
Informational 
resources 
Maintain correct-
ness and compre-
hensiveness 
Stamp (2006) InfoSec 
Technologies 
Security 
principle 
Data Prevent, or at least 
detect, unauthor-
ized writing  
Cole (2009) Network 
Security 
Security 
principle 
Information Prevent, detect and 
deter unauthorized 
modification 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2010, 
2011) 
InfoSec 
Management and 
Principles 
Quality or 
state 
Information Whole, complete 
and uncorrupted 
Stewart et al. 
(2011) 
Study Guide for 
InfoSec 
Professionals 
Security 
principle 
Data, objects and 
resources 
Maintain veracity, 
ensuring only au-
thorized changes 
and remaining un-
altered against the 
original state 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001); Dobson 
and Sawyer (2006) 
Computing  
Systems 
Dependability 
Attribute System Absence of im-
proper alterations 
Trivedi et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
and Security 
Models 
System 
ability 
Information Prevent unauthor-
ized modification 
and deletion 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation  
Security 
objective 
Information Protect against im-
proper modifica-
tion or destruction 
Lazzaronni et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial 
Control Systems 
Security 
Property System 
resources 
Modification or 
destruction only by 
authorized users 
 
Underlying the concept of integrity is the notion of change, with the majority of 
definitions addressing the access to information resources and the associated au-
thorization process. 
In terms of scope, the analysis is similar to the principle of confidentiality, 
since most definitions are proposed in the domain of InfoSec. 
Regarding the nature of the concept, there is also a similarity to the principle of 
confidentiality, to the extent that there is no predominant term, standing out prin-
ciple, objective, and characteristic. 
In what concerns the objects targeted by the definitions, there is a focus on in-
formation, data and systems. It is also important to note that ISO standards are fo-
cused on organization’s assets, i.e., anything that has value for the organization, be 
it tangible or intangible. In contrast to confidentiality, there are authors who put 
under the umbrella of integrity both information and systems. The inclusion of 
systems is justified by the fact that unauthorized modifications or faults may also 
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target systems, which may provoke unauthorized modifications in information, 
e.g. the case of processed data produced by an ill-conceived computer program. 
Considering the purpose of integrity, there are two major distinct streams. On 
the one hand, the principle of integrity ensures that information is complete, accu-
rate, and correct. On the other hand, integrity refers to the prevention of unauthor-
ized manipulation, modification, and destruction. In this sense we cannot say there 
is consensus among the definitions, although it is understood that the two streams 
are complementary. 
Evidence of alteration of information raises some challenges, since it may not 
be possible to compare the current state of information with its original state. Par-
ker (1998) argues that instead of considering the original state, we should take into 
account the previous state of information, although this may prove difficult for 
computed data or for information without source documents. 
A relevant issue associated with integrity is its contextual and behavioral di-
mension. The definition provided by ITGI (2007) stresses that the accuracy, com-
pleteness and validity of information should be judged according to the business 
values and expectations. The impact of the interpretation of information by people 
on integrity had already been underlined by Dhillon and Backhouse (2000), who 
argued for the need of users to have the capability to interpret information accord-
ing to the business rules of the organization they pertain to. If there is a deficit of 
this capability, even if the values of data, signs and symbols are maintained, the 
integrity of information will be compromised. 
Availability 
Availability is the third component of the traditional model for InfoSec. Probably, 
it is the principle whose compromise is most immediately evident for users. 
Table 3 summarizes the review made on the concept of integrity. 
Table 3. Summary of Availability Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Characteristic 
Quality 
n/a Use when and 
how wanted 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
Quality or state Information Be present or 
ready for immedi-
ate use 
EC (1991); 
Rannenberg (1993) 
IT Security 
Evaluation 
Essential 
aspect 
Information 
Resources 
Prevent unauthor-
ized withholding 
ISSA (2004) InfoSec  
Guidance 
Characteristic Information 
Information 
systems 
Be accessible and 
usable on a timely 
basis in the re-
quired manner 
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Stoneburner et al. 
(2004) 
IT Security 
Engineering 
Security 
goal 
Data 
Service 
Protect against at-
tempts to unau-
thorized deletion 
or to cause denial 
ISO (2005, 2009) Information 
Security 
Property Information Be accessible and 
usable to author-
ized entities  
Bowen et al. 
(2006) 
InfoSec 
Management 
Security 
objective 
Information Ensure timely and 
reliable access and 
use 
ITGI (2007) IT Control and 
Governance 
Control 
criteria 
Sensitive 
information 
Be available when 
required by the 
business process 
Neumann (1995) Computer 
Risks 
Term Resources Usable when 
needed 
Parker (1998) Computer 
crime 
Element  Information Usability for a 
purpose 
Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2000) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Security 
principle 
Organizational 
systems 
Remain available 
when needed 
Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2003) 
Computing 
Security 
Security 
objective 
Computational 
asset 
Be accessible to 
authorized parties 
at appropriate time 
Posthumus and 
von Solms (2004) 
InfoSec 
Governance 
Key 
characteristic 
Information 
resources 
Be accessible for 
use by the relevant 
parties at the right 
time 
Stamp (2006) InfoSec 
Technologies 
Security 
principle 
Information Prevent denial of 
service 
Cole (2009) Network 
Security 
Security 
principle 
Information Ensure timely and 
uninterrupted ac-
cess 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2010) 
InfoSec 
Management 
Characteristic 
Quality or state 
Information Be accessible and 
correctly format-
ted for use without 
interference or ob-
struction 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Critical 
characteristic 
Information Enable unob-
structed access to 
authorized users, 
people or comput-
er systems in the 
required format 
Stewart et al. 
(2011) 
Study Guide for 
InfoSec 
Professionals 
Security 
principle 
Data, objects  
and resources 
Grant timely and 
uninterrupted ac-
cess to authorized 
subjects 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001); Dobson 
Computing 
Systems 
Attribute System Readiness for cor-
rect service 
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and Sawyer (2006) Dependability 
Trivedi et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
and Security 
Capability System Perform the stated 
function at a spe-
cific time or over a 
stated period 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation  
Ability or state System Perform assigned 
function at a given 
time 
Lazzaronni et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial 
Control Systems 
Security 
Property System 
resources 
Be available to au-
thorized users 
whenever they re-
quest 
 
Regarding the scope and nature of availability, the conclusion to be drawn is 
similar to the one made for the principles of confidentiality and integrity, i.e., 
availability is proposed mainly on studies related to InfoSec, being named as a 
principle, characteristic and objective, or ability when definitions focus on sys-
tems. From the point of view of the object it stands out information and systems. 
In what concerns the purpose, it is relevant to distinguish between definitions 
with the focus on information and on systems, although their meaning is very 
close. An important issue relates to the access and possibility of using information 
and systems in a timely manner and, for systems, performing their function in a 
given time. However, and in contrast to the previous two principles, the concern 
with access is not uniquely placed on its restriction (as before, only authorized 
agents should be grant access to the information), but the main concern is to being 
able to grant access to those entitled to it. Although access to information is im-
portant, the definition advanced by the ISO standards suggests that being able to 
access information does not imply that the information is usable. The usability of 
information had already been remarked by Parker (1998) and elaborated by 
Whitman and Mattord, who qualify access in terms of authorization, format, and 
obstruction. 
A final note regards the timing issue pointed by Posthumus and von Solms 
(2004). Not only there may be a right moment for making information available, 
but also availability is always tested at a specific moment of time. 
2.2 Extensions of the Triad 
After reviewing the CIA model, we now present definitions for a set of ten attrib-
utes that do not make part of the InfoSec traditional framework, but may function 
as extensions of the CIA triad. 
The identification of these attributes resulted from the initial search that led to 
the finding of works that, besides the CIA model, refer to other attributes that can 
also be considered as InfoSec principles, taking into account their definitions and 
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characteristics. The same systematic review process was applied to this set of at-
tributes. The analysis of the corresponding definitions followed the same proce-
dure previously employed with the difference that, in most cases, the number of 
definitions is much more reduced. 
The ten attributes that will be discussed next are privacy, reliability, authentici-
ty, non-repudiation, accountability, safety, survivability, utility, accuracy, and 
possession. 
Privacy 
Privacy is one of the most discussed topics in the field of InfoSec (Whitman and 
Mattord 2011) and probably one of the most easily understood by society in gen-
eral. This is a concept closely related to the concept of confidentiality. Table 4 
summarizes the review made on the concept of privacy. 
Table 4. Summary of Privacy Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Not public or not 
accessible to any-
one 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Free from unau-
thorized intrusion 
Westin (1970) Privacy and 
Liberty 
Claim Personal 
information 
Determine when, 
how and to what 
extent it is dis-
closed 
Lategan and 
Olivier (2000) 
Information 
Privacy 
State Private 
information 
Control the access 
to private infor-
mation held by 
third parties 
Pfitzmann and 
Hansen (2010) 
Privacy n/a Information Anonymity, un-
linkability, unde-
tectability and un-
observability 
Stewart et al. 
(2011) 
Study Guide for 
InfoSec 
Professionals 
Security 
principle 
Personal and 
confidential 
information 
Prevent unauthor-
ized access, obser-
vation and moni-
toring 
Withman and  
Mattord (2011) 
Privacy 
Legislation 
State n/a Free from unsanc-
tioned intrusion 
 
The scope of the definitions, with the exclusion of those found in the dictionar-
ies, is always presented in the context of privacy itself. 
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Concerning the definition’s nature, privacy is referred to as a state, principle 
and even as a claim. 
The object of the reviewed definitions is information, although this results di-
rectly from the focus of the literature search. However, the ACL (2001) definition 
suggests that the meaning of the word is related to people and not to information. 
A similar view had already been advanced by Parker (1998, p. 227), who argued 
that privacy “refers to a human and constitutional right or freedom”, preferring to 
reason in terms of confidentiality of information in order to protect the privacy of 
people. Indeed, Prosser (1960) defined the privacy rights of an individual as oppo-
sition to several actions, including the public disclosure of embarrassing private 
facts about an individual. Over time, the use of the word privacy has expanded to 
encompass other objects, as can be noticed in the conceptualization of Clarke 
(2006) who identifies the privacy of the person, the privacy of personal behavior, 
the privacy of personal communications, and the privacy of personal data. 
Regarding the purpose, there are two distinct senses. One has to do with control 
of personal information held by third parties, including control over the disclosure 
of that information, and the other concerns non-intrusion, anonymity, unlinkabil-
ity, undetectability, and unobservability. Pfitzmann and Hansen (2010) have pro-
posed and characterized these last terms for a better understanding of the privacy 
concept, helping to clarify the privacy construct and to distinguish it from confi-
dentiality. The clarifications advanced by those authors for the supporting con-
cepts of privacy are the following: anonymity – a subject is not identifiable within 
a set of subjects; unlinkability – it is not possible to sufficiently distinguish if an 
item of interest (subject, message, or action) is linked to another item(s) of inter-
est; undetectability – it is not possible to sufficiently distinguish if an item of in-
terest exists or not; and unobservability – it refers to the anonymity of an item of 
interest or to the undetectability of a subject. 
In the case of privacy, the owner of the information is generally the individual 
to whom the information relates (the person in personal information). There may 
be other entities that hold the information, however, they usually act as custodians 
of that information. 
Reliability 
The concept of reliability is used in several contexts with a special emphasis on 
the domain of systems dependability. Table 5 summarizes the review made on the 
concept of reliability. 
Table 5. Summary of Reliability Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Characteristic or 
ability 
Device To operate for a cer-
tain time without 
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malfunction or inci-
dents 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
Quality or state n/a To be suitable or fit 
to be relied upon 
ITGI (2007) IT Control and 
Governance 
Control criteria Information Suitability to the 
needs of manage-
ment 
ISO (2009) Information 
Security 
Property Information Consistent behavior 
and results 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001, 2004a, 
2004b); Dobson 
and Sawyer (2006) 
Computing 
Systems 
Dependability 
Attribute System Continuity of correct 
service 
Trivedi et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability and 
Security Models 
Probability  System Absence of failures 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation  
Capability and 
continuity measure 
System Perform the stated 
function flawless 
Lazzaronni et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial Control 
Systems Security 
Attribute System Continuity of correct 
service 
 
The principle of reliability, unlikely the previous reviewed principles, is mainly 
proposed in the realm of systems instead of information. Both ITGI and ISO doc-
uments do not associate reliability directly to information security. 
Regarding the nature of the concept, in the perspective of systems it is present-
ed as an attribute or ability. In the perspective of information it is presented as a 
property. 
The object that is mainly targeted by the definitions is the system, with the pur-
pose of the principle being the continuity of service delivery or the flawless func-
tion of a system. Actually, Trivedi et al. (2009) suggest that reliability may be 
conceived as a measure of the continuity of service. 
Authenticity 
In contrast to reliability, the principle of authenticity is applicable to information 
itself. It is also often applied to processes and people as it can be observed in Ta-
ble 6. 
Table 6. Summary of Authenticity Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Quality n/a To be truthful, 
trustworthy and au-
thentic 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Conformity to an 
original, not false or 
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imitation 
ISO (2009) Information 
Security 
Property Entity It is what it claims 
to be 
Parker (1998) Computer 
Crime 
Element Information Validity, conform-
ance and  
genuineness 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Quality or state Information To be genuine or 
original 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001, 2004a, 
2004b) 
Computing 
Systems 
Dependability 
Secondary 
attribute 
Message Integrity of content 
and origin 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation 
Property System Being able to verify 
the identity of a us-
er, process, or de-
vice 
 
This principle is proposed in the realms of InfoSec and dependability. As re-
gards the nature, the definitions reviewed do not convey a clear tendency. In what 
concerns purpose, it is relevant to distinguish between the authenticity of users, 
i.e., the confirmation of their identity, and the authenticity of information in the 
sense of being genuine. 
At a first glance, there is a certain degree of overlap between authenticity and 
integrity. Probably, one of the main supporters of the distinction between the two 
principles is Parker (1998). This author proposed a pair of principles formed by in-
tegrity and authenticity, in which the first relates to completeness, and the second 
to validity. According to his view, an entity is authentic if it represents the desired 
facts and reality. To illustrate the differences between the two principles, Parker 
exemplifies with a scenario in which a software distributor obtained a computer 
game program from an obscure publisher. The distributor modified the name of 
the publisher on the media and title screens to that of a well-known publisher and 
then made copies of the media. Without informing either publisher, the distributor 
disseminated copies of the program in a foreign country. Parker observes that the 
program had integrity because it identified a publisher and was complete and 
sound. However, it was not an authentic game from the well-known publisher, i.e., 
it did not conform to reality since it misrepresented the publisher of the game. 
Non-Repudiation 
The principle of non-repudiation shares some of the features of authenticity. Giv-
ing the apparent overlap between the concepts, Parker (1998) argues that non-
repudiation is contained and covered by authenticity, since it is a form of misrep-
resentation by rejecting information that is actual valid, not including this princi-
ple in his InfoSec framework. A different view was conveyed by the USA De-
partment of Defense, who added non-repudiation to the traditional InfoSec model 
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(DoD 2002). Therefore, it is important to analyze definitions for non-repudiation 
proposed in other contexts. Table 7 summarizes the review made on the concept of 
non-repudiation. 
Table 7. Summary of Non-Repudiation Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Accept, not repel 
and not reject 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a No refusal to be 
associated with a 
particular event 
EC (1991) IT Security 
Evaluation 
Security 
function 
Data n/a 
Stoneburner et al. 
(2004) 
IT Security 
Engineering 
n/a Users and 
processes 
Ensure non-
repudiation 
ISO (2005) InfoSec 
Management 
Security 
goal 
Event or 
action 
Obtain evidence of 
the occurrence or 
non-occurrence 
ITGI (2007) IT Control and 
Governance 
n/a Sensitive 
information 
Ensure non-
repudiation of 
origin 
ISO (2009) Information 
Security 
Ability Event or  
action 
Prove the occur-
rence and  
involvement of the 
originator 
Stamp (2006) InfoSec 
Technologies 
n/a Transaction User cannot deny 
to have made 
transaction 
Cole (2009) Network 
Security 
Feature Information Do not deny send-
ing to receiver 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001, 2004a, 
2004b) 
Computing 
System 
Dependability 
Secondary 
attribute 
Message Availability and 
integrity of the 
identity of the 
sender and receiver 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation 
Assurance Information Prove the delivery 
and identity of the 
sender  
Lazzaronni et al. 
(2010) 
Industrial Control 
Systems Security 
n/a Security 
relevant actions 
To be known and 
undeniable or hid-
den by the authors 
 
Non-repudiation is proposed mainly in InfoSec, although it was not possible to 
isolate a consensual nature for this principle. This principle plays a central role in 
communications security, where it is important to prove that a message originated 
from a specific sender (non-repudiation of origin) and that a message was accept-
ed by a specific receiver (non-repudiation of reception). 
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The object focused by definitions varies, with information and actions or events 
receiving a special accentuation. 
Concerning the purpose, there is an emphasis on the identification of a particu-
lar entity and the unequivocal association of that entity with an event or action. 
The essential point of this concept rests on the capability to ensure that a certain 
event did occur or did not occur and, in the first case, to be able to identify the en-
tities involved. In other words, all actions relevant to InfoSec made in a system are 
known and cannot be denied or hidden by their authors (Lazzaroni et al. 2010). 
A final observation regards the importance of the inverse of repudiation. Be-
sides having the ability to demonstrate that a certain agent has actually made cer-
tain transactions even when the agent denies it, it is also important to be able to 
demonstrate that a certain agent has not performed certain actions even if the 
agent claims to have made such transactions. 
Accountability 
Accountability is presented by several authors as an InfoSec principle, despite not 
applying directly to information itself, but to the people that manipulate infor-
mation. In the definitions analyzed it is immediately recognizable some parallels 
between the definitions of non-repudiation and accountability, especially in as-
pects related to the identity or identification of people. Table 8 summarizes the re-
view made on the concept of accountability. 
Table 8. Summary of Accountability Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Quality Someone or 
something 
Attribute the cause 
of a fact or situa-
tion 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
Quality or 
state 
n/a Obligation or will-
ingness to accept 
responsibility 
ISSA (2004) InfoSec 
Guidance 
Security 
principle 
Parties and 
processes 
Audit actions of 
who interacts with 
information 
Stoneburner et al. 
(2004) 
TI Security 
Engineering 
Security 
goal 
Entity Impute actions 
ISO (2009) Information 
Security 
Property Entity Attribute and im-
pute consequences 
for actions and de-
cisions 
Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger (2003) 
Computational 
Security 
n/a Security events 
and people 
Log and list 
Cole (2009) Network 
Security 
n/a Individuals Held responsible 
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Whitman and 
Mattord (2010) 
InfoSec 
Management and 
Principles 
n/a Information Assign each activi-
ty to person or pro-
cess 
Stewart et al. 
(2011) 
Study Guide 
for InfoSec 
Professionals 
Security 
principle 
Individuals Impute responsibil-
ity for actions 
Avizienis et al. 
(2001, 2004a, 
2004b) 
Computing 
Systems 
Dependability 
Attribute People Availability and in-
tegrity of identity 
Al-Kuwaiti et 
al. (2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation 
Capability People or 
entities 
Track and audit ac-
tions in systems 
 
This principle is mainly versed in studies related to InfoSec and the users are its 
main object. The purpose of accountability shares similarities with the purpose of 
non-repudiation, in that both seek to attribute responsibility for events or actions 
to a given entity. From the definitions reviewed, it was also possible to verify the 
connection between accountability and the activities of control and auditing, lead-
ing Whitman and Mattord (2011) to observe that accountability is also known as 
auditability. Still, in the realm of dependability, non-repudiation is usually applied 
to the transmission of messages, while accountability is applied to people’s identi-
ty. The main concern, though, is to be able to assign and impute to a specific enti-
ty the consequences of a certain action or decision that was detrimental to the se-
curity of IS (ISO 2009). This assumes particular relevance in the attribution of 
blame and in the cases of disputes settled in court. 
Safety 
The concept of safety was found in the literature on dependability of systems. In 
the Portuguese dictionary, safety is presented as synonym of security (ACL 2001), 
corresponding to the absence of danger. The meaning advanced by the English 
dictionary is closer to the definitions proposed by systems dependability research-
ers, as showed in Table 9. 
Table 9. Summary of Safety Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
State n/a Tranquility and confi-
dence 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
Condition n/a To be safe from suffer-
ing or cause suffering, 
injury, or loss 
Neumann (1995) Computer 
Risks 
Term People Well-being 
Avizienis et al. Computing Attribute System Absence of catastrophic 
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(2001, 2004a, 2004b); 
Dobson and Sawyer 
(2006) 
Systems 
Dependability 
consequences on the 
user and environment 
Trivedi et al. (2009) Security and 
Dependability 
Models 
Capability  System Avoidance of cata-
strophic consequences 
on the user and envi-
ronment 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation  
Property System To not fail with cata-
strophic damage 
 
In the definitions analyzed, safety is used in the realm of systems, and there is 
significant consensus regarding the purpose of this principle, namely the absence 
of catastrophic consequences on the environment and people. In centering the 
concept on the effects of system misbehavior, proponents classify consequences as 
catastrophic, circumscribing the concept to the situations where outcomes exceed 
a certain threshold (e.g., when human lives are in danger or are lost). Essentially, 
it is an ability or property of a system to not cause harm to environment and peo-
ple. 
Survivability 
As in the case of other concepts already reviewed, survivability is presented not as 
a principle applied directly to information, but applied to systems in general. Table 
10 summarizes the review made on the concept of survivability. 
Table 10. Summary of Survivability Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Continuous existence 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Exist under certain 
conditions 
Deutsch and 
Willis (1988) 
Software 
Engineering 
n/a System Continue to perform 
essential functions 
Neumann (1995) Computer 
Risks 
Term System Ability to continue to 
make available, de-
spite adverse cir-
cumstances 
Ellison et al. 
(1997) 
Computing 
Networks 
Ability System Deliver essential 
services in the pres-
ence of attacks and 
failures 
Bowen et al. 
(2000) 
Network 
Intrusion  
n/a Network 
system 
Continue to operate 
even under attack 
Westmark (2004) Information Ability System Provide minimum 
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Systems 
Survivability 
level of service in 
the presence of 
threats 
Al-Kuwaiti et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
Evaluation 
Property System 
Subsystem 
Equipment 
Process 
Procedure 
Continue to function 
during and after ac-
cidental or deliberate 
disturbance 
Trivedi et al. 
(2009) 
Dependability 
and Security 
Models 
Capability System Fulfill mission, in a 
timely manner, in the 
presence of attacks, 
failures, or accidents 
 
As mentioned, the object focused by the definitions is the system (computers 
and networks). Concerning the nature, survivability is usually presented as a sys-
tem’s ability, whose purpose is to maintain operation even in the presence of fail-
ures or attacks. This principle is interrelated with the resilience trait of systems, 
understood as the capability to respond to and recover quickly from crisis situa-
tions. In order to survive, a system needs to adapt to the changing conditions of its 
environment (attacks, failures, and accidents) so that restoration of a minimum 
level of service is attainable. 
Utility 
In the field of InfoSec, the principle of utility appears in the framework proposed 
by Parker (1998). Table 11 summarizes the review made on the concept of utility. 
Table 11. Summary of Utility Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
n/a Something 
useful 
To take benefit 
from 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Worth to an end or 
fitness for some 
purpose 
Parker (1998) Computer 
Crime 
Element Information Usefulness for a 
purpose 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Critical 
characteristic 
Information To have value for a 
purpose or end 
 
Parker articulates the principle of utility with the principle of availability, relat-
ing the first to usefulness of information and the second to usability of infor-
mation. To illustrate the difference between those principles, Parker outlines a 
scenario where an employee that routinely encrypts the only copy of valuable in-
formation stored in his computer, accidently erases the encryption key of the file. 
20  
In this case, the availability of information is maintained, but its usefulness is lost. 
In a way, Parker restricts availability to the preservation of access to information, 
separating its access from its use. If a user accesses information that is presented 
in a language he does not understand we will have a compromise of utility, alt-
hough the information maintains its availability. 
By indexing the utility of information to a specific purpose, Parker brings to the 
realm of InfoSec concerns about the degree of usefulness of information for the 
task users have in hand. 
Accuracy 
The concept of accuracy is used in many various contexts. In the field of InfoSec 
it was introduced by Whitman and Mattord (2011) in their expanded model of crit-
ical information characteristics. Table 12 summarizes the review made on this 
concept. 
Table 12. Summary of Accuracy Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
Quality n/a Free from deficien-
cies, failures and er-
rors 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Conformity to truth, 
standard or model 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Critical 
characteristic 
Information Free from errors and 
omissions 
 
Whitman and Mattord (2011) combine in the principle of information accuracy 
the freedom from mistakes and errors and the existence of the value that the end 
user expects, arguing that if information has been modified, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, it is no longer accurate. At the first glance, this understanding approx-
imates the definition of integrity. However, if we consider the examples provided 
by those authors we are able to clarify the meaning of accuracy. Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) illustrate the principle using a checking account example. An indi-
vidual assumes that the information contained in the checking account is an accu-
rate representation of his finances. Incorrect information in the checking account 
may result from external or internal errors. A bank teller may mistakenly add or 
subtract too much from the account, incorrectly changing the value of information. 
The account holder may accidently enter an incorrect amount in his account regis-
ter. In contrast to the integrity definitions, both situations described for the check-
ing account example differ from the fact that the agents (bank teller and account 
holder) are authorized to change the information, however, they modify it to an 
incorrect value. 
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Possession 
The principle of possession of information is part of the InfoSec expanded model 
proposed by Parker (1998).  Whitman and Mattord (2011) have also included this 
principle in their InfoSec model. Table 13 summarizes the review made on the 
concept of possession. 
Table 13. Summary of Possession Definitions 
Authors Scope Nature Object Purpose 
ACL (2001) Portuguese 
Dictionary 
State n/a To hold something 
M-W (2012) English 
Dictionary 
n/a n/a Have control or take 
into control 
Parker (1998) Computer 
Crime 
Element Information Hold, control and 
have the ability to 
use 
Whitman and 
Mattord (2011) 
InfoSec 
Principles 
Critical 
characteristic 
Information Ownership or 
control 
 
From these definitions, it is stressed the aspect of information control. Nowa-
days, it seems consensually accepted that ownership and control of information 
are perhaps the most important sources of power in organizations. 
Parker (1998) justifies the addition of this principle to the traditional model so 
that InfoSec efforts may prevent certain types of losses, such as theft of infor-
mation. The rational outlined by that author is clarified by contrasting between 
possession and confidentiality. By definition, the principle of possession deals on-
ly with what people possess and know, not what they possess without knowing. 
To illustrate this difference, Parker describes a scenario where burglars broke into 
a computer center and stole media containing the company’s computer master 
files and the associated backup copies of the files. The gang held the materials for 
ransom. Confidentiality was not an issue because burglars had no reason to read or 
disclose the information contained in the files. The company lost possession of the 
files (availability was delayed, but the firm could retrieve the information at any 
time by paying the ransom). Increasingly, we own significant information that we, 
but that we own, such as object files. 
Since it is usually extremely simple and cheap to produce additional copies of 
information, we may have different degrees of control regarding the information 
we own. This will be the case of having exclusive or shared possession of infor-
mation, as well as being able to regain ownership after a temporary loss of posses-
sion. 
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2.3 Complements to the Triad 
In this section we review four principles proposed by Dhillon and Backhouse 
(2000) that constitute a clear departure from the CIA triad. Instead of restricting 
their attention to information stored or in transit in silicon processors (computers 
and networks), those authors focused the security challenges placed and faced by 
biological processors of information (people). Consequently, this group of princi-
ples mainly focuses on the conduct and behavior of people in an organizational 
context that may have impact in the integrity of the organization as a whole, or in 
the security of information manipulation activities in particular. Thus, the four 
principles form a complement to the CIA triad instead of just extending the tradi-
tional model of InfoSec. 
The four principles are known by the acronym RITE (Responsibility, Integrity, 
Trust, Ethicality) and they are defined below. 
Responsibility – Contrasting to accountability, this principle refers to the re-
sponsibility that each member of an organization should observe when performing 
its function. With the disappearance of vertical management structures, a clear 
perception of personal responsibility and knowing what roles to play within the 
organization become increasingly important. The relevance of responsibility is 
more acute when new circumstances arise in the organization and it becomes nec-
essary for someone to voluntarily assume the responsibility (even if it has not been 
assigned) to deal with these same circumstances. Otherwise, by not assuming the 
new responsibility the level of risk of the information system may increase and the 
integrity of the organization may be in jeopardy. 
Integrity – In today’s organizations information is one of the most valuable as-
set, however, it is an asset that by its nature may be easily divulged to unauthor-
ized parties. In this respect personal integrity is of particular importance. Never-
theless, organizations do not always check the references of their future employees 
before granting them access to sensitive information, and even if they check, there 
is no warranty that a person maintains its integrity forever. Although the designa-
tion of this principle is the same as the one that composes the CIA triad, in this 
context integrity is connected to the loyalty of the members of the organization. 
Trust – Trust, as opposed to external control, is of particular importance in or-
ganizations geographically diffuse where members cannot control each other and 
"physically supervision" is not an option. In this context it is expected that each 
member acts according to the norms and standards of behavior accepted and im-
plemented by the organization, regardless of the  distance that lies between the 
member and the organization physical core. 
Ethicality – This principle advocates that members of an organization should 
adopt ethical behaviors even if these are not formally defined and implemented. It 
essentially deals with the informal relationships that are established within the or-
ganization and with behavior in the face of new situations for which there are 
simply no pre-defined rules on how to act or interpret. 
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2.4 Remarks on the Review 
In this section we present a set of remarks on the literature reviewed and on the In-
foSec principles that were identified and discussed. 
The first remark is that InfoSec, currently, may still develop largely around the 
traditional principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. This situation is 
of particular concern when international standards, such as ISO/IEC 27000 family, 
especially ISO/IEC 27001 due to its role in certification, do not yet incorporate in 
their content explicit and accurate references to and concerns with additional In-
foSec principles that are fundamental for dealing with the growing complexity of 
threats to the security of organizations’ information assets. 
As it can be seen in the review presented, it is relatively easy to find scientific 
literature on the traditional principles of InfoSec, contrary to what is the case for 
other InfoSec principles. 
Additionally, there were few authors who sought to expand the traditional CIA 
model, proposing new models or frameworks that include additional principles of 
InfoSec, with the works by Parker (1998), Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) and 
Whitman and Mattord (2011) being exceptions. 
Regarding the principles of InfoSec that were identified, from the point of view 
of the focused object, they can be grouped into three major classes: focus on in-
formation, focus on systems, and focus on people. 
In an attempt to synthesize the literature reviewed, we present in Figure 1 the 
results of crossing two of the elements analyzed in the definitions that we consid-
ered important to characterize and to distinguish each of the principles: the pur-
pose and the object focused. Based on this diagram one can check the positioning 
of the principles in relation to those two axes, as well as the intersections or prox-
imity that exist between principles. 
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Do not disclose
To be free from errors and 
omissions
To hold and control
To be of value to an end
Do not manipulate, modify or 
destroy
Ensure the identity and 
genuineness
To be accessible and usable
Absence of catastrophic 
consequences
To work flawlessly
To function in the presence of 
failures and attacks
Identify author of the action
Impute the action to an entity
To be responsible
To be righteous
To be trustworthy
To be ethical
Information System People
OBJECT
P
U
R
P
O
S
E
INTEGRITY
NON-REPUDIATION
ACCOUNTABILITY
RESPONSIBILITY
INTEGRITY
TRUST
ETHICALITY
SURVIVABILITY
SAFETY
UTILITY
CONFIDENTIALITY
ACCURACY
POSSESSION
PRIVACY
AVAILABILITY
AUTHENTICITY
RELIABILITY
Fig. 1. Summary of Literature Reviewed 
3 Relating InfoSec Threats to InfoSec Principles 
In the field of InfoSec threats are a fundamental concept. Threats feed risk analy-
sis exercises, concentrating the attention of security managers who project and 
implement controls aimed to mitigate the effects of threats turned into attacks. 
One way to connect threats and their potential impacts on information systems’ 
assets is by considering what InfoSec principles may be in jeopardy if threats ma-
terialize. 
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In order to get a better grasp of the InfoSec principles reviewed, and thus taking 
a further step towards the proposal of a revised framework of InfoSec principles, 
we crossed the principles to a battery of InfoSec threats. This exercise served as a 
test on the scope and completeness of the list of principles. 
To operationalize this test we needed to instantiate the principles to a suffi-
ciently broad and representative set of InfoSec threats. To this end we condensed a 
Unified Threat Catalog (UTC) that resulted from the fusion of four distinct threat 
and attack catalogs featured in Table 14. 
Table 14. InfoSec Threat and Attack Catalogs 
Author 
(Citation) 
Focus Structure Number of 
Threats 
Federal Office for 
Information Security 
(BSI 2005) 
Operational Risks Five chapters: Force 
Majeur, Organizational 
Shortcomings, Human 
Failure, Technical Fail-
ure, Deliberate Acts 
370 detailed 
threats 
Financial Services 
Roundtable’s 
Technology Task Force 
(BITS 2004) 
Operational Risks 70 threat categories 622 generic risks 
Microsoft 
(Microsoft 2007) 
Security Risks in 
Applications 
Structured list  36 detailed attacks 
organized in 19 
high level attacks 
Fred Cohen – Sandia 
National Laboratories 
(Cohen 1997) 
Classes of Attack 
Methods 
Simple list 94 attack methods 
 
The option for condensing the four catalogs in a unified view, instead of simply 
applying one of the catalogs, was taken since we concluded that per se the original 
catalogs contained too general or too technical and detailed InfoSec threats and at-
tacks. This would hinder the process of relating threats and attacks to the previous-
ly identified InfoSec principles. It was also considered that none of the catalogs 
alone was sufficiently complete and comprehensive to carry out the intended exer-
cise. Thus, we decided to prepare a new catalog which resulted from the merger of 
the four catalogs mentioned above, taking as base the catalog issued by the Ger-
man Federal Office for Information Security. Of the four catalogs, that one was 
considered the most comprehensive and complete and the one where, despite some 
exceptions, the threats and their respective descriptions are relatively straightfor-
ward to understand, not being too general or too detailed and technical. 
The procedure for creating the UTC consisted of the following steps: 
 Identify threats duplicated in the catalogs, according to the descriptions provid-
ed, and join them, adopting the designation considered more direct and easy to 
understand; 
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  Identify threats not present in the base catalog and include them in the UTC. 
At the end we obtained a catalog composed of 422 threats organized into five 
categories and 32 subcategories, as presented in Table 15. 
Table 15. Structure of the Unified Threat Catalog 
Category (number of threats) Subcategory 
Force Majeur (13) n/a 
Organizational Shortcomings (104) Infrastructure Planning, Management and Control 
Archive, Data Media and Database Management 
Outsourcing and Contractual Policy 
Human Resources Management and Training 
Management, Planning and Control Flaws 
Inadequate Procedures, Configurations and Regulations 
Human Failure (82) Negligent and Improper actions 
Lack of Compliance with Rules 
Incorrect Configuration/Administration 
Errors 
Technical Failure (55) Power 
Network and Telecommunications 
Storage and Archive 
Software 
Database 
Infrastructure and Hardware 
Authentication 
Encryption 
Other 
Deliberate Acts (169) Manipulation, Tampering and Misuse 
Espionage (interception, observation) 
People 
Rights and Privileges Exploitation 
Malware 
Denial of Service 
Access 
Abuse and Unauthorized Procedures 
Network and Telecommunications 
Spoofing and Masquerading 
Vulnerabilities Exploitation 
Fraud 
Specific Attacks 
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The main categories were taken directly from the German catalog. The subcat-
egories were introduced to allow a more logic organization of similar threats (from 
the point of view of its consequences on InfoSec principles) that were scattered 
and could complicate the analysis of the catalog. 
The process of relating threats to principles consisted of, for each of the threats, 
identify the potentially affected principles. The intersection of the threats with the 
principles was based on the strict interpretation of the description of the threat in 
order to try to reduce the degree of subjectivity in the evaluation. In the case of 
threats with too general descriptions, whose attribution to specific InfoSec princi-
ples became unfeasible, we chose not to consider them, marking those threats as 
generic/general. 
The outcomes of undertaking the process led to the formulation of four propo-
sitions. 
Reinterpretation of Survivability Principle 
Considering the definitions for the survivability principle, and taking into account 
that none of the UTC threats matched this principle, we reinterpreted this principle 
as a contributor to availability. In this view, survivability is perceived as an ability 
of a system to endure severe situations. The ability to withstand serious attacks 
and to be tolerant to failures is particularly important for systems comprising na-
tional critical information infrastructures and it has attracted much attention in the 
areas of cyber defense and SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) 
systems security. 
Discard of Safety Principle 
As defined by several authors, safety means the absence of catastrophic conse-
quences on the environment caused by a given system. Safety may be considered 
as a general principle related to adverse situations, since it aims to preserve the 
environment outside a given system, information systems included. Furthermore, 
it was not possible to attribute any of the UTC threats to safety. 
Proposal of Legality Principle 
During the crossing process, it was found that some threats regarding legal conse-
quences for the organization, and that could jeopardize InfoSec, could not be 
matched to any of the principles identified. Thereby, we propose the inclusion of a 
new principle, named legality, in order to address those particular threats. 
We consider this principle particularly relevant in the present times, given the 
increased need for InfoSec professionals to ensure the compliance of information 
systems controls with several regulatory pieces (Berghel 2005). 
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Maintenance of RITE Principles 
Analyzing the results of the crossing process, one notes that RITE principles have 
a reduced expression in terms of the number of threats that may impact those prin-
ciples. At first, one could be led to discard these principles, but a finer considera-
tion of the contents of UTC may suggest a different alternative. Indeed, the UTC 
resulted from the fusion of four catalogs, so it shares the qualities and shortcom-
ings of those underlying catalogs. 
We argue that one of the shortcomings of the UTC is its adherence to the tradi-
tional InfoSec principles, namely the CIA triad, leaving out other potential princi-
ples, especially those that complement confidentiality, integrity and availability, as 
is the case of RITE principles. Indeed, UTC and the base catalogs may suffer from 
a too restrictive focus on information stored in and in transit between IT systems. 
As Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) have noted, “The traditional information securi-
ty principles of confidentiality, integrity and availability are fine as far as they go, 
but they are very restricted. They apply most obviously to information seen as ‘da-
ta’ held on computer systems where confidentiality is the prevention of unauthor-
ized disclosure, integrity the prevention of the unauthorized modification, and 
availability the prevention of unauthorized withholding of data or resources.” As 
the authors conclude, it is a common conception to apply the CIA triad at the 
technical level, but it is the human and social context that determines the success 
of InfoSec technical controls. 
In order to find a more robust support for our claim regarding the UTC (and the 
originator catalogs), we undertook an additional analysis of the UTC, this time by 
relating its threats to the elements of Alter’s (1999, 2008) Work System Model 
(WSM). The goal of this process was to evaluate the degree of coverage of UTC’s 
set of threats. 
According to Alter (2008, p. 451), “A work system is a system in which human 
participants and/or machines perform work (processes and activities) using infor-
mation, technology, and other resources to produce specific products and/or ser-
vices for specific internal or external customers.” Alter views information systems 
as work systems, whose processes and activities are dedicated to capturing, trans-
mitting, storing, retrieving, processing, and displaying information. In Figure 2 we 
present the architecture of the WSM. 
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Fig. 2. Work System Model (Alter 2008, p. 461) 
The process that we undertook to relate UTC and WSM was similar to the one 
applied to the crossing of UTC and InfoSec principles: based on the description of 
each threat, we determined which elements of the WSM would suffer the conse-
quences of the threat. Figure 3 summarizes the results of this process of relating 
UTC and WSM. The three most affected elements of the WSM are Information, 
Technologies, and Processes and Activities. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Correspondence between UTC and WSM 
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It is evident that UTC threats do not uniformly cover all WSM elements, being 
concentrated on informational, technological, and functional aspects. Therefore, 
we argue there is a need to assess threats that may have an impact on elements 
such as Strategy, Environment, and Products and Services, but also to focus on in-
formation stored, communicated, and manipulated by biological processors, which 
are encapsulated in WSM Customers and Participants elements. According to 
WSM definitions, customers are people who benefit directly from the products 
and services produced by the work system. Participants include people who per-
form work in the business process, which may use IT extensively or residually, or 
that do not use IT at all. 
It should be mentioned, however, that, as in the case of relating UTC threats to 
InfoSec principles, an effort was made to interpret narrowly and objectively the 
description of each of the threats, which helps to explain why WSM elements such 
as Products and Services, Environment, and Customers present very small values 
in what concerns the impacts of UTC threats. In a broader interpretation it would 
be logical to assume that threats that have an impact on Information, Technolo-
gies, and Processes and Activities may have direct consequences, for example, on 
Products and Services, and Customers in an organization. 
4 Proposal of a Revised Framework of Information Security 
Principles 
In this section we present the revised framework of InfoSec principles and briefly 
describe the processes that led to its creation. 
The framework relies on the process of literature review that was conducted, in 
which we identified a set of concepts that, by their definitions and characteristics, 
were initially considered as InfoSec principles. 
Subsequently, this initial set of principles was evaluated in terms of complete-
ness and wholeness through its intersection with the UTC. The procedure adopted 
was to identify the principle or principles affected by each of the threats, thus 
seeking to ensure that the proposed framework would encompass all threats con-
tained in the adopted catalog and assess the need to suggest new InfoSec princi-
ples due to unmatched threats to the initial set of principles. Additionally, we also 
related the UTC with the elements of the WSM. The two procedures helped us to 
draw broader conclusions regarding the preponderance of the proposed principles 
and elements of the WSM for InfoSec, providing additional robustness to the pro-
posal and also allowing a different approach to the problem underlying this work. 
The framework formulation process was iterative in nature, since over the 
course of it we needed to revisit and adjust the definitions that were initially as-
sumed to be appropriate, as well as to review the structure and organization of the 
framework itself. 
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Next, we present the revised framework of InfoSec principles, followed by an 
exposition of a set of logical implications between the principles and a reappraisal 
of the relationship between the principles included in the framework and the UTC. 
4.1 The Revised Framework 
The proposed framework consists of thirteen principles and five sub-principles, 
organized as presented in Figure 4 and with the definitions adopted for each com-
ponent enumerated in Table 16. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed Framework of InfoSec Principles 
The InfoSec principles were grouped into five distinct dimensions: To Know, 
To Change, To Use, To Comply, and To Be. This arrangement results from the 
main purpose of the principles pertaining to each dimension, i.e., inside each cate-
gory, the constituent principles contribute to protect the same integrative issue. 
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Table 16. Adopted Definitions for Information Security Principles 
Dimension Principle Definition 
To Know 
Confidentiality Information is only disclosed to or observed by individuals, 
entities and processes authorized by its owner. 
Privacy Information to identify, detect, associate or trace an indi-
vidual is only disclosed to or observed by individuals, enti-
ties and processes authorized by that individual or desig-
nated by law. 
Possession Information is held and controlled by its owner or by indi-
viduals, entities and processes authorized by him. 
To Change 
Integrity Information and systems are modified in an authorized 
manner only by individuals, entities and processes author-
ized by the owner of those assets. 
Authenticity Information is in accordance with a particular reality, and 
its genuineness and validity are verifiable, or an individual, 
entity or process is who it claims to be. 
Accuracy Information is free from errors, flaws and omissions. 
To Use 
Availability Information and the systems supporting it are usable when-
ever required by individuals, entities or processes author-
ized by their owners. 
Reliability System performs its function without failure over a deter-
mined period of time. 
Survivability System delivers essential services in the presence of at-
tacks, failures or accidents. 
Utility Information or systems can be used for serving a given 
purpose defined by their owners. 
To Comply 
Traceability Actions relevant to InfoSec are demonstrable and imputa-
ble to their authors. 
Non-Repudiation Actions relevant to InfoSec are known and cannot be de-
nied or hidden by their authors, or unfounded claimed as 
performed by some agent. 
Accountability Actions relevant to InfoSec are attributable to the individu-
als responsible for those actions. 
Legality InfoSec related procedures comply with applicable laws, 
statutes, regulations, and contractual obligations, safeguard-
ing the organization’s liability on a civil and criminal basis. 
To Be 
Responsibility Each member of an organization has a clear understanding 
of its roles and responsibilities, assuming ad hoc responsi-
bilities when new developments require it. 
Integrity Each member of an organization is loyal to the organization 
and remains so. 
Trust Each member of an organization behaves accordingly to the 
organization’s accepted and agreed norms and patterns of 
behavior. 
Ethicality Each member of an organization adopts an ethical behavior 
even if the ethical practices are not formalized or stated. 
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The To Know dimension relates to the intrinsic value of information, i.e., its 
content and meaning. Privacy is presented as a sub-principle of confidentiality in 
that it refers exclusively to maintaining the confidentiality of specific information 
about people or their behavior, while the principle of confidentiality regards to all 
kinds of information. Hence, Privacy is conceived as a specialization or refine-
ment of the principle of Confidentiality, although in certain contexts Privacy can, 
by itself, stand out. 
In what concerns Possession, it is considered relevant to follow the perspective 
advanced by Parker (1998) according to which, the violation of this principle does 
not necessarily imply to not hold and to not control information as one might as-
sume based on the definition presented. Information, being an intangible asset eas-
ily replicable, may be in possession of several entities. In this sense, a violation, 
for example, of the principle of confidentiality implies the violation of the exclu-
sive possession of certain information. However, it is possible to have a situation 
of shared Possession where the owner of the information continues to own and 
control the information, simply does not do so exclusively. The principles and 
sub-principles that integrate this dimension essentially seek to prevent the disclo-
sure to and observation of information by unauthorized entities, as well as control 
of information. 
The second dimension, To Change, focuses primarily on actions that result in 
the modification and manipulation of information. The principles integrating this 
dimension seek to ensure that any modification of information is authorized by its 
owner, that is made only in an authorized manner, by individuals, entities, or pro-
cesses whose identity is verifiable and that the information accurately reflects a 
certain reality. 
It is important to clarify the meaning of the definition of the principle of Accu-
racy. In a first approach, one could consider Accuracy not as a principle, but as a 
sub-principle of Authenticity, since its definition meets the first part of the defini-
tion of Authenticity “... accurately reflects a certain reality ...”, however, and alt-
hough it is recognized that there is some overlap between the two principles, the 
definition of accuracy focuses particularly on avoiding mistakes, failures, and 
omissions related to form and content. Illustrative examples are errors such as a 
misplaced comma in a numeric field, an extra zero or a missing zero, or typos. In 
this regard it is considered important to stress Accuracy of information as an In-
foSec principle. 
The third dimension – To Use – relates directly to the ability to use information 
or the systems that support and manipulate it. The observance of Availability, Re-
liability, Survivability, and Utility seeks to ensure that both information and sys-
tems that handle it are available for use by authorized entities, reliably, maintain-
ing a sufficient degree of operation even after attack or failure, and whenever 
necessary. 
Reliability is considered a sub-principle of Availability. Based on the definition 
adopted for Reliability, we consider that this concept is a prerequisite (though not 
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exclusively) to the full observance of the principle of Availability, and therefore 
does not justify to be elevated to a principle by its own. A similar reasoning guid-
ed the decision of classifying Survivability as a sub-principle of Availability, pair-
ing with Reliability. 
Regarding the principle of Utility, a superficial analysis could lead to not con-
sider this principle as an InfoSec principle, but as a general principle that infor-
mation and systems must meet. Nevertheless, from an organizational point of 
view, especially from the point of view of information systems security manage-
ment, Utility is particularly relevant as it does not matter to an organization to pro-
tect information or systems that are not useful to its activity, i.e., it does not make 
sense to apply human and financial resources to ensure the availability of useless 
information, possibly neglecting the protection of strategic information and sys-
tems for the organization. 
The fourth dimension of the framework – To Comply – includes a set of prin-
ciples and sub-principles which aims to address the need for controlling proce-
dures in an organization, as well as ensuring technological and regulatory compli-
ance of InfoSec efforts. 
We propose the principle of Traceability as arising from the unification of the 
concepts of Accountability and Non-repudiation, in order to get a more complete 
and comprehensive principle. Therefore, the observance of the principle of Trace-
ability and sub-principles Non-repudiation and Accountability ensures that any ac-
tion relevant to InfoSec is provable, i.e., there are records of those actions, and 
that it can be unequivocally attributed to a specific individual, entity, or process. 
The principle of Legality focuses on safeguarding negative impacts on InfoSec 
resulting from legislation and regulation inobservance and on safeguarding the or-
ganization itself in civil and criminal terms. In some countries like the USA there 
are, for example, restrictions on the use of encryption techniques that can make it 
impossible to use certain information and jeopardize its security. Furthermore, in 
the current globalized world, the knowledge, implementation, and compliance 
with InfoSec related legislation is particularly relevant. It should be noted that this 
principle was not identified in the literature reviewed, resulting from the process 
of relating InfoSec principles to InfoSec threats, and from the acknowledgment 
that regulatory aspects currently have a significant impact on InfoSec. 
The fifth dimension – To Be – addresses what members of an organization 
must “be” within that organization in order to maintain the well-being and viabil-
ity of the organization. The constituent principles focus on the behaviors that indi-
viduals should adopt, especially when faced with new and unforeseen situations 
for which there are not formalized rules or codes of practice. These principles are 
dependent upon the values, beliefs, and personal motivations of the organization’s 
members, contributing to the establishment and maintenance of an InfoSec culture 
(Dhillon 2007). This dimension has a principle (Integrity) whose designation is the 
same as the designation given to a principle pertaining to the To Change dimen-
sion. We chose to keep the designations that were in use by tradition or as named 
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by its proponents. Nevertheless, the semantics associated to each of those princi-
ples is clearly distinct. 
4.2 Relationships between Principles of the Framework 
In this section we make explicit relationships between some of the principles that 
compose the revised framework, in the form of logical implication propositions. 
These propositions are exclusively supported and based on the definitions that 
were provided in Table 16. In Table 17 we show the logical propositions and the 
corresponding interpretation in natural language. 
Table 17. Relationships of Logical Implication between Principles of Information Security 
# Logical Proposition Interpretation 
1 ¬Confidentiality ⇒ ¬Possession The violation of the principle of confi-
dentiality implies the violation of the 
principle of possession 
2 ¬Privacy⇒ ¬Confidentiality ⇒ ¬Possession The violation of the principle of privacy 
implies the violation of the principles of 
confidentiality and possession 
3 ¬Availability ⇒ ¬Utility The violation of the principle of availa-
bility implies the violation of the princi-
ple of utility 
4 ¬Authenticity ⇒ ¬Traceability The violation of the principle of authen-
ticity implies the violation of the princi-
ple of traceability 
 
Regarding the first proposition it is logical to assume that a breach of confiden-
tiality will, perforce, imply a breach of possession. However, the inverse proposi-
tion does not hold, i.e., a breach of possession does not necessarily imply a breach 
of confidentiality. For example, in the case of negligent or accidental deletion of 
confidential information there is a breach of the principle of possession, in the 
sense that information is no longer owned and controlled, but there is no disclo-
sure of information to unauthorized entities, the information simply ceased to ex-
ist. Analyzing this proposition, not under the perspective of the violation of the 
principles, but under the perspective of its preservation, one can then infer that the 
preservation of possession implies the preservation of confidentiality. As an illus-
trative example, if an individual or organization has the ownership (as per the def-
inition given for possession) of a given information, that information will only 
cease being confidential if the owner so desires. It should be reminded that posses-
sion is here understood as exclusive possession. 
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The second proposition follows the same logic advanced for the first proposi-
tion, and derives from the fact that privacy is considered a sub-principle of confi-
dentiality. 
Regarding the third proposition, it is relevant to note that information or sys-
tems to be useful must necessarily be available when they are needed, otherwise 
there is a violation of the principle of utility, in the sense that if they are not avail-
able they cannot be used for a particular purpose. 
However, the inverse proposition (¬Utility ⇒ ¬Availability) does not hold. For 
example, an organization may have at its disposal a large amount of information, 
therefore fully available, which does not serve its purpose, being useless infor-
mation which there is no interest to protect. From the point of view of the preser-
vation of the principles (instead of their violation) it follows that the preservation 
of utility implies the preservation of availability. In light of the definition given to 
utility, information will only be used if it is available. 
In the fourth proposition we relate the principle of authenticity to the principle 
of traceability. The observance of the principle of traceability and consequently of 
its sub-principles, non-repudiation and accountability, presupposes the existence 
of authentic information in accordance with the definition advanced for authentici-
ty. If this condition is not verified, e.g., if there is false information recorded about 
the identity of a user who manipulated certain information, the principle of tracea-
bility is violated since it is not possible to unambiguously determine who in fact 
manipulated the information. This is an interesting proposition because it relates 
principles pertaining to two different dimensions. 
The implication relationships that were advanced are those that we assume as 
universal, i.e., verifiable in any context in the light of the proposed definitions. In 
certain contexts or particular cases it may be possible to infer other logical propo-
sitions. 
4.3 Revisiting the Relationship between InfoSec Threats and 
InfoSec Principles 
The proposed framework of InfoSec principles combines a set of definitions for 
the constituent principles with a structuration of the principles. These two features 
of the framework justify revisiting the previously established relationships be-
tween InfoSec threats, based on the UTC, and the InfoSec principles. The analysis 
of the relationships provides a holistic and quantitative view of the relations be-
tween InfoSec threats and the InfoSec principles as proposed in the framework. 
Figure 5 displays the InfoSec principles with the highest number of matches 
with the UTC threats. 
The results reflect the implication relationships described in Section 4.2, with 
the principles of Possession, Availability, Utility, Confidentiality and Integrity be-
ing the most affected. However, this does not mean that we can overlook or un-
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derestimate the threats to the remaining principles since we argue that information 
security depends on the observance of the framework as a whole. 
It is also pertinent to mention that the threat catalogs that led to the UTC gener-
ally follow the traditional CIA model, which helps to explain the prevalence of 
threats on the traditional InfoSec principles (the results obtained for Possession 
and Utility, which are not part of the traditional model, derive from the logical im-
plication propositions exposed in Section 4.2). 
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Fig. 5. Number of Matches UTC vs. InfoSec Principles 
Another perspective is provided by the analysis of results obtained for the di-
mensions that constitute the revised framework, as illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Fig. 6. Number of Matches UTC by Dimension  
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The dimension To Know, constituted by the principles of Confidentiality and 
Possession, and by the sub-principle of Privacy, and the dimension To Use, consti-
tuted by the principles of Availability and Utility, and by the sub-principles Relia-
bility and Survivability, are those that condense a greater number of matches. 
We argue that the absence of matches with the principles of the To Be dimen-
sion should not prompt the removal of the corresponding principles or be inter-
preted as a sign of subsidiarity of those principles in relation to all the other prin-
ciples. The common view in InfoSec points people as the weakest link of the 
InfoSec protection efforts, thus implying that a special consideration of the role of 
people should be taken into consideration. As a complement to that view, we ar-
gue that people is also the strongest link of the InfoSec protection efforts: not only 
the quality and appropriateness of security controls are a function of the individu-
als that design, implement, interpret, and maintain those controls, but also the 
members of the organization form the last line of defense against threats not ad-
dressed or only partially covered by technical safeguards. Instead of discarding the 
To Be principles, we urge to the development of an encompassing catalog of 
threats that takes into account the personal and social dimensions of InfoSec. 
5 Metrics for the Information Security Principles 
After presenting the revised framework of InfoSec principles, we are now in posi-
tion to address the issue of measurement. In this section we suggest for each prin-
ciple metrics that may assist, in case of attack or failure, to assess the extent to 
which that principle was compromised. 
It should be noted from the beginning that the suggested metrics are purely 
conceptual resulting directly from the definitions adopted for each of the InfoSec 
principles and lacking tests in real environments. Basically, it is an initial effort to 
mitigate the gaps identified in the literature on InfoSec metrics, and to assign 
measures directly to the InfoSec principles. 
Research on InfoSec metrics is relatively recent and there are no consolidated 
references widely accepted by the scientific community, InfoSec professionals and 
managers to assess the level of InfoSec of an organization (Pfleeger 2009). 
The inexistence of measurement references accrue from several factors, includ-
ing the difficulty of measuring InfoSec (Pfleeger and Cunningham 2010); depend-
ence on subjective, human and qualitative inputs, illusory means to obtain meas-
urements; lack of understanding of information security mechanisms (Jansen 
2011), immaturity of research efforts and fragmentation of the knowledge areas 
that need to combine efforts to produce a holistic model for InfoSec measurement 
(Savola 2007). This does not mean, however, the absence of important contribu-
tions for InfoSec evaluation over time, such as TCSEC, SSE-CMM (Systems Se-
curity Engineering Capability Maturity Model), and Common Criteria, as well as 
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proposals of high level taxonomies for InfoSec metrics (cf. Chew et al. (2008), 
CISWG (2005), Savola (2007), Seddigh et al. (2004)). 
Besides these contributions, NIST and ISO have produced two major works re-
garding InfoSec metrics, namely NIST SP 800-55 Rev. 1 and ISO/IEC 27004, 
which provide guidelines for the development, selection and implementation of 
InfoSec measures. These documents include illustrative and candidate InfoSec 
measures to evaluate the effectiveness and quality of organizations’ information 
security protection efforts. This stated purpose for evaluation is consistent with 
several definitions of InfoSec metrics, such as “quantitative measurements of trust 
indicating how well a system meets the security requirements” (Wang 2005) and 
“measurable standards to monitor the effectiveness of goals and objectives estab-
lished for IT security” (Patriciu et al. 2006). 
According to Wang (2005), the InfoSec metrics that have been developed suf-
fer from five limitations: security metrics are often qualitative rather than quantita-
tive, subjective rather than objective, defined without a formal model as an under-
lined support, there is no time aspect associated with the current security metric 
definitions, and traditional two-value logics are not suitable for security analysis. 
To counteract this state of affairs regarding InfoSec measures, Jaquith (2007) 
and Jansen (2011) proposed several characteristics that metrics should show in or-
der to be useful, effective, and objective. Among the characteristics that metrics 
should have are the following: to be consistently measured, to have a low cost of 
implementation, to be expressed numerically or as a percentage, to use a unit of 
measurement, and to be relevant for those who are going to analyze them. 
With these features in mind, and aiming to evaluate the extension of compro-
mise of the InfoSec principles, we propose the basic set of metrics listed in Table 
18. 
Table 18. Metrics for Information Security Principles 
Dimension Principle Metric 
To Know 
Confidentiality 
Privacy 
% of confidential/private information observed by or dis-
closed to unauthorized entities 
Number of unauthorized entities that accessed infor-
mation 
Possession 
% of information that is no longer exclusively held and 
controlled 
Number of unauthorized entities now holding and con-
trolling information 
To Change 
Integrity 
% of information/systems modified or manipulated by 
unauthorized entities, in an unauthorized manner 
Authenticity 
% of information not genuine and invalid in face of reali-
ty 
% of individuals, entities and processes whose identity 
could be verified 
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Accuracy 
Number of errors, omissions and failures detected in in-
formation 
To Use 
Availability 
Reliability 
Survivability 
% of available information/systems 
Downtime 
Number of entities affected by the unavailability 
% of system unavailable 
Failure frequency 
Mean time between failures 
Mean time to recover 
% of systems inoperative after attack, failure or accident 
Utility 
% of systems unusable for a given purpose 
% of information unusable for a given purpose 
To Comply 
Traceability 
Non-Repudiation 
Accountability 
% of actions relevant to InfoSec whose authors are un-
known or whose authorship cannot be proven 
% of entities whose actions relevant to InfoSec were not 
subject to registration 
% of actions relevant to InfoSec which were not imputa-
ble to an agent in terms of accountability 
Legality 
Number of cases where it was not possible to use certain 
information by non-respecting the applicable legislation 
Number of legal proceedings resulting from illegal pro-
cedures or actions related with InfoSec 
To Be 
Responsibility 
Number of InfoSec incidents or failures that resulted 
from the fact that there was not a clear understanding of 
an organizational member’s roles and responsibilities 
Integrity 
% of members that engaged with external parties in det-
rimental actions to the organization’s InfoSec level 
% of members that misrepresented personal references, 
abused their InfoSec privileges or discharged their In-
foSec responsibilities without diligence and honesty 
Trust 
% of members that disrespected organization’s accepted 
norms and patterns of behavior 
Ethicality 
Number of InfoSec incidents or failures that originated 
from the adoption of unethical conducts 
 
As noted, the metrics flow directly from the definitions that were adopted for 
the InfoSec principles and form a first iteration to achieve a set of metrics that 
shows the ideal characteristics previously enumerated. In future versions, more 
sophisticated formulations of the metrics should take into account issues such as 
the value of information affected, the criticality of systems impaired, the costs of 
the incident, and the effect of time. 
Two of the main features of the set of proposed metrics are its simplicity and ex 
post nature. The metrics are simple to understand and to quantify, although some 
require the collection of based data and the establishment of the corresponding da-
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ta collection structures (e.g., to measure confidentiality related breaches it is need-
ed to previously perform an information inventory, to classify information and to 
define the entities authorized to access information). They are also a posteriori or 
ex post measures, i.e., they focus on after the fact events, since they provide indi-
cations regarding compromise of InfoSec principles. This implies that the accura-
cy of the measures is totally dependent on the detection capabilities of the organi-
zation: if a breach is not known or acknowledged by the organization, the 
respective measure will not reflect it. 
In contrast to other InfoSec proposed measures, such as the ones advanced in 
NIST SP 800-55 Rev. 1, the suggested set of metrics does not provide an indica-
tion of the estimated quality and efficacy of InfoSec protection efforts. Actually, it 
complements those kinds of measures. Instead of measuring the budget devoted to 
information security, the percentage of high vulnerabilities mitigated within or-
ganizationally defined time periods after discovery, the percentage of security per-
sonnel that have received security training, or the percentage of systems that have 
conducted annual contingency plan testing, it gives evidence of the actual effec-
tiveness of InfoSec protection efforts. An important future line of research would 
be to define an alternative set of metrics, directly connected to the InfoSec princi-
ples, that instead of assessing the extent to which each of the principles has been 
compromised, indicates how well a particular security control contributes to the 
preservation of those principles. 
6 Conclusion 
The growing dependence of organizations on information and IT justifies the ex-
istence of updated references that assist organizations to protect their information-
al assets. Over time, several authors have argued for an update group of principles 
that may guide the information security efforts of organizations, both by reviewing 
the meanings of current principles, and by suggesting additional principles that 
help InfoSec stakeholders to keep up with the evolution of business requirements, 
threats, and technology. 
In view of this continual need to reconsider the foundations that define infor-
mation security, we proposed a revised framework of information security princi-
ples structured in five dimensions containing thirteen principles and five sub-
principles. Each of the components of the framework was defined and supple-
mented with a basic and initial set of metrics. 
We hope that these contributions may prove useful for the management of in-
formation security in organizations, assisting its stakeholders to engage in a dia-
logue regarding the goals of information protection and the means that best ac-
complish the attainment of an appropriate information security level. 
The proposed framework of information security principles is not final and 
should be open to debate and revision. It is our expectation that it may prompt the 
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development of an updated catalog of information security threats closely related 
or rooted in those principles, as well as the emergence of new insights regarding 
more mature and sophisticated InfoSec effectiveness metrics. 
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